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OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES: PUBLIC
INTEREST LAWYERING IN AN ERA
OF PRIVATIZATION
Louise G. Trubek*
INTRODUCTION
Both the theory and practice of public interest lawyering are in
transition. Whereas the public interest lawyer of the 1960s and
1970s typically advocated before administrative agencies and
courts on behalf of poor people and underrepresented groups,' the
public interest lawyer of today assumes a much greater variety of
roles and is involved in a broader array of tasks. One of the causes
of this development is the privatization of government, which has
been defined as an increased reliance on the private institutions of
society to satisfy public needs.2 The institutions involved in this
shift are quite diverse, ranging from the marketplace and corpora-
tions, to charitable organizations and the family.3 Although many
have lauded privatization as a means of making government more
efficient and responsive to community needs, the jury is still out on
whether privatization in all its varied forms is a positive develop-
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School and Senior At-
torney, Center for Public Representation (lgtrubek@facstaff.wisc.edu). I would like
to express my deep appreciation to Ed Baker for his editorial assistance and support.
1. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUS-
TICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA (1976) [hereinafter BALANCING
SCALES]; David M. Trubek, Book Review, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 303 (1977).
2. See Remarks of E.S. Savas, in Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Gov-
ernment, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy
in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001). Privatization can be
described as the "movement out." Other causes behind the change in public interest
practice include devolution, the blurring of professional boundaries, and changes in
technology. For devolution, see Donald F. Kettl, The Transformation of Governance:
Globalization, Devolution, and the Role of Government (June 1, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal). For blurring of profes-
sional boundaries, see Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Col-
laboratives: Multidisciplinary Practices For People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000). For
changes in technology, see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclo-
sure Laws and American Healthcare, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
3. Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium, Rede-
fining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001).
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ment from the standpoint of the disadvantaged and those who ad-
vocate on their behalf.4
A central concern is that a privatized government is less trans-
parent and participatory than traditional governance, and there-
fore less accountable, both to the public as a whole and to the
constituency receiving the services.5 My own experience indicates
that this concern is somewhat misdirected. As the founder and Ex-
ecutive Director of the Center for Public Representation, the old-
est public interest law firm in Wisconsin, I have observed that
public interest lawyers can work effectively within a privatized sys-
tem on behalf of their constituencies. Doing so, however, requires
reimagining the role of the public interest advocate and adopting
new strategies to foster transparency and participation in the
changed regulatory environment. In this essay, I will support this
claim by providing examples from my own experience.
I. PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING BEFORE PRIVATIZATION
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the practice of public in-
terest law before privatization became widespread.6 In 1973, I was
a lawyer based in a Madison, Wisconsin, a graduate of the Yale
Law School, familiar with the new theory and practice of public
interest law.7 With the dean of Wisconsin Law School, I decided to
set up a Wisconsin-based version of the public interest law firms
springing up in New York, Washington, and California. 8 The or-
ganization we created, the Center for Public Representation
("CPR"), has provided advocacy for the underrepresented on a va-
riety of issues over the years, including environmental regulation,
consumer protection, and gender discrimination. 9 As a nonprofit
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., id.; Robert S. Gilmour & Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing Government
Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of "State Action," 58
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247 (1998).
6. Of course, American governance always has involved some private mecha-
nisms. What is noteworthy is that in the past several decades, this way of doing busi-
ness has become a platform on which politicians get elected and a means by which
social service programs previously handled exclusively by the government have been
privatized.
7. For the theory and practice of public interest law in the 1960s and 1970s, see
BALANCING SCALES, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Louise G. Trubek, Untitled (Feb. 18, 1974) (on file
with Fordham Urban Law Journal); Center for Public Representation Articles of In-
corporation (Dec. 18, 1973) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinaf-
ter CPR Articles of Incorporation]; By-Laws of Center for Public Representation,
Inc. (Jan. 2, 1974) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter CPR
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organization, we have received funding for our efforts from foun-
dations, government agencies, law schools, lawyers, and bar as-
sociations. Currently, CPR speaks out for its constituencies
through information dissemination, policy research, and advocacy,
public workshops, and clinical programs in the areas of health care,
telecommunications, and consumer protection. 10 Our focus con-
sistently has been to advocate for our clients in the administrative
process."
The original conceptualization of CPR reflected the broader the-
ory of public interest law prevalent at the time. 2 As described in
Balancing the Scales of Justice, the original theory underlying pub-
lic interest practice relied on the existence of administrative agen-
cies that embodied bureaucratic expertise and public commitment
to state action.13 Public interest practice was envisioned as assert-
ing a voice for individuals and groups whose interests were ignored
because of their inability to organize and obtain resources to coun-
terbalance more powerful parties advocating before agencies. 14
Finding themselves in a position of relative weakness, public inter-
est lawyers consistently criticized the agency system as being too
hierarchical, unresponsive, and unbalanced. 5 This critique helped
to undermine the public perception of government as the solution
to all social problems, thereby contributing to privatization. 16
Inspired and influenced by this conceptual model, our goal at
CPR was to advocate on behalf of underrepresented interests
through participation in administrative agency processes at the
state level. We envisioned our staff as a cadre of full-time lawyers
dedicated to public interest practice. We firmly believed that our
expertise as lawyers with substantive knowledge of the field would
enable us to speak out effectively before agency decision-makers,
and that our advocacy would counteract the resources and knowl-
edge of the regulated industry, thereby "balancing the scales of jus-
By-Laws]; Center for Public Representation, at http://www.law.wisc.edu/pal [hereinaf-
ter CPR Web site].
10. See, e.g., CPR Web site, supra note 9.
11. Id.
12. BALANCING SCALES, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See generally CPR Articles of Incorporation, CPR By-Laws, supra note 9;
BALANCING SCALES, supra note 1.
16. Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice, 1
PUB. INT. L. J. 49 (1991), reprinted in JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 236-37 (1997).
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tice." 17 The result, we hoped, would be a fairer process at the
agency level and, perhaps, some substantive changes in the law as
well. Over the years, our efforts have met with some success.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING AND PRIVATIZATION
The privatization of public services dates to the early 1980s and
the Reagan presidency.18 This trend reached Wisconsin a few years
later, in the mid-1980s. The processes of privatization affected
CPR's practice because it overlapped with three areas on which we
had chosen to focus our energies: health care, telecommunications,
and antipoverty. The following is a brief description of privatiza-
tion in Wisconsin and the manner in which we at CPR adapted our
practices to serve our clients.
A. Privatization in Wisconsin
Wisconsin has been a leader in privatization, not only in the area
of welfare reform, but also in health care and telecommunications.
Health care was the first area the state reorganized, through a pro-
cess called managed competition. 9 Under managed competition,
Wisconsin converted public and private health care delivery and
financing into a system in which Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions ("HMOs"), both nonprofit and for-profit, competed with
each other for health care contracts from public and private
payors.20 Reflecting the pervasiveness of privatization, the state
Medicaid program switched to the new system in the mid-1980s. 21
The success of Medicaid managed care subsequently led to Badger-
Care, a well-regarded new program that funds health care for low-
income families.2 2 A complex system of participation mechanisms
eventually evolved into the system that is in place today.2 3 Priva-
17. BALANCING SCALES, supra note 1.
18. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVA-
TIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 4 (1996).
19. Louise Trubek, Making Managed Competition A Social Arena: Strategies for
Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 276 (1994).
20. Id.
21. Louise G. Trubek, Symposium: The Health Care Puzzle: Creating Coverage for
Low-Wage Workers And Their Families, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE
POST-WELFARE ERA 143 (Joel F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999).
22. Id.
23. Louise G. Trubek, Symposium, Medicaid Managed Care: Symposium on Con-
sumer Protection in Managed Care: Mechanisms of Consumer Protection-the Market-
place and Regulation, The Social HMO for Low-Income Families: Consumer
Protection and Community Participation, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1143, 1152-53
(1996).
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tization also occurred in the employer-provided-health care sector.
Specifically, concerns for quality and access resulted in Wisonsin's
enactment of patient protection legislation and administrative
rules.24 These rules created new dispute resolution systems, im-
posed data collection and analysis requirements, and inserted pro-
tections for patients into the contractual agreements between
physicians and managed care organizations.25
In the early 1990s, Wisconsin also privatized telecommunications
by limiting the regulatory role of the Public Service Commission.26
As part of the legislation that brought about these changes, Wis-
consin created a fund to maintain access and equity during the
transition to a market-based system.27 A council consisting of a
minority of telecommunication providers and a majority of con-
sumer representatives would oversee this fund. As part of its activ-
ities, the council developed programs to provide equity and access
to telecommunication services. 28 Two of these are original to Wis-
consin: (1) a program to fund telemedicine equipment for non-
profit and local public health agencies that serve the uninsured;
and (2) a program to fund telecommunications projects by non-
profits that assist low-income populations and persons with
disabilities.2 9
Finally, in the 1990s, Wisconsin privatized the administration of
welfare benefits through a program called "W-2."3 ° The legislation
creating W-2 required welfare services to be contracted out to pri-
vate agencies, and the use of performance criteria in the con-
tracts.3 Health advocates expressed concern at the time that the
selected agencies, which were chosen by requests for bids based on
a master contract, would not adequately inform and enroll people
for the Medicaid program.32 When Wisconsin sent the second
round of W-2 contracts out for bids, health advocates pressed for
the insertion of a performance criterion to measure an organiza-
24. Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claiming, Contracting: Enforcement in the Man-
aged Care Era, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 133 (1999).
25. Id.
26. WIS. STAT. § 196.218 (1993) (deregulating telecommunications in Wisconsin).
27. Adam Nathe, Special Report-Promoting Universal Service Through Grant
Funding for Non-Profits: Wisconsin PSC § 160.125's First Grant Cycle, in 26 THE PUB.
EYE i (2001).
28. Id. at i-ii.
29. Id.
30. Act of April 25, 1996, 1995 Wis. Laws 289.
31. WIs. STAT. § 49.143 (1996).
32. JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY
LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 167 (1999 Supplement).
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tion's success in enrolling welfare beneficiaries in health care plans,
thereby putting pressure on bidders to take this task more seri-
ously. The state Department of Workforce Development adopted
this suggestion, establishing a benchmark to indicate the number of
individuals who obtained jobs providing adequate health care cov-
erage.33 A committee now monitors this benchmark on a monthly
basis.34
B. Changes to CPR Practice
In response to the three areas of privatization described above,
CPR's practice underwent a gradual but profound change over the
course of the past decade. Because administrative agencies were
no longer the central or exclusive arena for public interest advo-
cacy, we developed three new strategies for achieving our original
goal of giving voice to the underrepresented. These strategies in-
cluded strengthening nonprofits, working with collaborative
groups, and monitoring the performance of private and public
agencies in the new system.
1. Strengthening Nonprofits
Nonprofit agencies serve as ideal candidates for providing ser-
vices in a privatized system because they tend to be more par-
ticipatory in their internal structures and delivery mechanisms than
their for-profit counterparts. The ability of nonprofit agencies to
compete for available funds in the privatized arena, however, is
limited by their often underdeveloped financial and organizational
infrastructure, including their low-level of technological compe-
tence. CPR is addressing this problem by actively helping nonprof-
its obtain funding for technology equipment and training that will
enable them to be more efficient in serving their clients and more
competitive in future contracting. We are the main proponent and
watchdog for the grant programs made available to nonprofits by
33. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development Performance Standards
(2000) [to be provided]. State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development,
Department Announces 95% of W-2 Agencies Meet or Exceed Performance Standards
(Feb. 16, 2001), http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/notespub/DWDWebMa/389e_ 536.htm.
34. W-2 Contract & Implementation Committee, http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/-
desw2/w2min/2001_minutes.htm.
35. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVE-
MENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (forthcoming 2001) (manu-
script on file with author); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic
Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997).
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the state's Public Service Commission. 36 Our staff maintains pres-
sure on the Commission to continue these programs and provides
information and training to nonprofits that wish to take advantage
of them. This new type of advocacy, to which we devote a signifi-
cant amount of our time and resources, is part of our overall strat-
egy of strengthening the role of nonprofits in the new public/
private networks.
2. Working with Collaborative Groups
As a consequence of privatization, government agencies no
longer have exclusive decision-making power. Rather, this author-
ity now is decentralized and distributed among different public and
private groups.37 Many of these groups have yet to fully grasp their
new roles, including how to network with others in the new priva-
tized environment. For example, in the health care arena, man-
aged care created great confusion and dismay among nonprofits
and public health agencies, and among health care professionals
and insurers as well. CPR has participated in two collaborative
networks to address this confusion.
First, as Medicaid managed care emerged in the state, CPR
helped initiate forums on both a regional and state-wide basis that
brought together community groups, public interest advocates,
state and county officials, health care providers, and HMOs.38
These ongoing forums provide opportunities for participants to
comment on the contracting process, identify problems in the sys-
tem, and develop performance standards. Second, when private
employer funded managed care began to impact consumers and
physicians, CPR formed a coalition of consumer and health care
professional groups called "Collaboration for HealthCare Con-
sumer Protection" ("CHCP"). 39 The Collaboration meets with
representatives of private insurers, managed care organizations,
administrative agencies, and the state legislature.4 Together, we
identify problems in the quality and accessibility of health care,
with particular attention placed on employer-funded insurance.
Once the problems have been identified, we seek solutions that are
36. Nathe, supra note 27.
37. HANDLER, supra note 18, at 1, 8.
38. See Trubek, supra note 23, at 1152-54.
39. COLLABORATION ON HEALTHCARE CONSUMER PROTECTION MISSION STATE-
MENT (1999) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
40. Id.
41. CHCP GRANT DOCUMENT, PHYSICIAN-CONSUMER PARTNERSHIP IN ADVO-
CACY (1999) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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supported by a consensus of the disparate member groups. This
type of cooperative interaction was hard to imagine under the
older model of public interest advocacy.
3. Monitoring Performance
A further aspect of privatization is reliance on contracting for
services. Unfortunately, contracting can have undesirable conse-
quences if the bidding process is not equitable and performance
not carefully monitored. When welfare reform began in Wisconsin,
CPR realized that the new system, which included contracting out
of services, could have a potentially negative effect on the number
of recipients of health care coverage provided through Medicaid.
Like others, we feared that the Medicaid entitlement retained
under the welfare reform legislation would be underutilized by
confused former recipients of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program ("AFDC").42 We therefore sought and obtained
evaluative standards in the contracts between the state and the
agencies administering the program. These standards measured
the number of enrollees who had taken advantage of their Medi-
caid benefits and placed responsibility on the private agencies that
were administering the delivery system to reach a benchmark fig-
ure. To ensure continued efforts to reach and exceed the bench-
mark, local agencies regularly report on their compliance with the
benchmark standard. Moreover, there are regular meetings among
state officials, contracting agencies, and others community advo-
cates to monitor compliance and progress in meeting the bench-
mark. Participants also share ideas for improving the practice of
contracting agencies. The standards and data that come out of
these meetings are available to the public, and much of the work,
42. AFDC, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 627 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
615 (1982)), was a federal program that provided cash grants to families and children
whose incomes are not adequate to meet their basic needs, http://192.234.213.2/
chc5180.html. AFDC prohibited private entities "from determining eligibility or per-
forming case management functions" in this area. NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS,
WISCONSIN STUDY: PRIVATIZING WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ncpa.org/
pd/private/feb98d.html. AFDC factored contributing to the eligibility of families to
receive grants included the death, incapacity or continued absence of both parents,
unemployment of one or both parents, or certain foster care situations, http://
192.234.213.2/-chc5l80.html. Created in the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
("TANF") program became effective on July 1, 1997 and replaced the AFDC Pro-
gram, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa.
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including minutes of the monitoring committee meetings, is made
available on the state Web site.43
C. Accountability and Privatization
CPR's three new strategies offer guidance for improving trans-
parency and participation in a privatized system, thereby clarifying
the lines of accountability. First, by strengthening nonprofits, pub-
lic interest lawyers tap into those organizations that, because of
their grassroots nature, serve as a direct link to the community, and
are ideally suited to get a broader array of people and interests
involved in the mechanisms of government. Raising their level of
service has a snowball effect. As nonprofits are strengthened, they
are better able to serve their constituency. Their success in doing
so gains them more respect in the system, and they are thereby
better able to compete for additional funding. Moreover, as non-
profits become more embedded in the social service delivery net-
work, they are more likely to speak out when the needs of the
community are not being met. Because they are in the best posi-
tion to know what these needs are, nonprofits have a certain built-
in credibility that other actors typically lack.44 Thus, when non-
profits complain that others are "hiding the ball," their complaints
are more likely to be heard by the public and the press. Of course,
there is no guarantee that nonprofits will maintain their grassroots
character and integrity in light of the seduction of money and
power. The challenge they face is to remain participatory and
transparent in their own organizational structure and activities
even as they increase in scope and size. Opening their books to
outside scrutiny and placing information on the Web is one way in
which nonprofits can ensure their own accountability, and that of
the system as a whole.
A second means of improving accountability in a privatized sys-
tem is through collaborations. By forming collaborations, public
interest lawyers can take advantage of the uncertainty inherent in a
privatized environment as to what service delivery practices will be
effective. Faced with this uncertainty, traditional and non-tradi-
tional actors have a greater incentive not only to join collabora-
tions, but also to share information and work cooperatively once
43. For more information, see http://www.wisconsin.gov/state/home.
44. These nonprofits have become integrated in the health care delivery system in
Medicaid managed care. Their ability to provide and advocate for services for specific
communities such as Latinas and Hmong have made them an essential part of the
heath care delivery system. See generally Trubek, supra note 24.
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they do. This may allow under-represented groups to play a more
influential role in the design of new practices and to gain more
timely access to valuable information that might not have been
available before. Public interest lawyers can use this information
to intervene more quickly on behalf of their constituencies, making
the system more transparent and responsive to community needs.
Accountability is further improved by the non-adversarial nature
of collaborations. Working side-by-side rather than at arm's length
fosters a sense of trust and dependency between public interest
groups and traditionally stronger actors that is not easily betrayed.
This dynamic, however, requires advocates for under-represented
groups to remain true to their constituency while exploring ap-
proaches that may be initially threatening to preconceived notions
of success. Public interest lawyers may also be reluctant to learn
the new skills and invest the time and energy on informal interac-
tions that is necessary to make the collaborative process effective.
Finally, accountability can be achieved by monitoring the out-
comes and processes of a privatized system. As described earlier,
contracting is one way in which opportunities for monitoring are
created through privatization. Standards can be inserted into con-
tracts to evaluate performance. Assuming that the standards are
arrived at through a collaborative process, public interest lawyers
can influence the information that the contracting agency must col-
lect and reveal. They also can take an active role in analyzing the
data collected and making it available to the public. Both steps
serve to increase the transparency of the system, and thus the ac-
countability of the actors. To be effective, however, the perform-
ance standards must be well designed and service providers must
be discouraged from "teaching to the test," namely, narrowing
their services to concentrate exclusively on the privileged stan-
dards, rather than attending to more personal and contextual
needs. Public interest lawyers also must learn the technical skills
necessary to evaluate meaningfully complex informational systems.
CONCLUSION
My experience with CPR indicates that privatization forces ad-
aptation of the traditional public interest law practice. The earlier
conception of public interest advocacy was based on a regulatory
system in which the agencies were the primary arenas for public
interest law firms to present competing points of view. Public in-
terest firms used these arenas to provide not only a competing
voice but also to serve as a "watchdog" over the impartiality of
1748
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government agencies. Under privatization, public interest lawyers
still can serve as watchdogs and spokespersons for the disadvan-
taged. But, in order to maintain this two-pronged role, they must
rethink their advocacy strategies and learn new skills. Like putting
old wine in new bottles, public interest lawyers must adapt if they
are to maintain their essential role in our complex and often une-
qual society.
.D !
